Nuclear Oversight Lacking Worldwide

Arnie Gundersen
October 5, 2011



Nuclear Oversight Lacking Worldwide
by grtv

Fairewinds disagrees with a recent New York Times Opinion that claims that Fukushima was caused because Japanese regulators did not properly oversee Tokyo Electric.

Fairewinds shows that in the United States, the same cozy relationship exists between the NRC and the nuclear industry.

Proper regulation of nuclear power has been coopted worldwide by industry refusal to implement the cost to assure nuclear safety.



2011 / 10 / 07
Todd Millions says:

Back about 1970-A japanese scientist(whose name and title escapes memory),was reported too have studied the cost of tapping into the easily available(in japan) geothermal heat too provide all electrical demands forseeable.His estimate of cost was about 10% of the nuc program they were then embarking on.
As I recall the only thing he didn't forsee in the icelandic program of 10 years later,was the special counter rotating swedish waste steam turbines used in the sucessful icelandic effort-they weren't available in 1970.
None of this has made scan too interweb(according too my goggling),and I lost my clippings years ago.
Other memories may be stimulated by this-and added too the' solar is much cheaper' studies from the last round of nuc disabling japanese quakes.The ones the media have such difficulty recalling now.

2012 / 10 / 20
Sujoy says:

Unit 1 timeline (abbreviated) 11MAR 1537 loss of all AC after 2nd tumsani 1818 placed isolation condenser in service 1825 removed isolation condenser from service (likely due to concerns over brittle fracture prevention due to the high CDR observed earlier) 2119 water level 8 above TAF (likely accurate indication and with water over the fuel no/minimal core damage. Also no data to establish a water loss rate which is going to be the rate of water leaving through the relief valves) 2151 reactor building access loss due to high dose rates (indication of first fuel damage core is likely partially uncovered causing the fuel damage) 2200 water level jumps to 21.7 above TAF (this is indication of reactor vessel depressurization and we are seeing flashing in the reference legs) 12MAR 0230 Containment reaches 122 psia 0245 Reactor pressure decreased to 116 psia (the report does not say this but having lived through reference leg flashing during transients and rapid plant cool downs any water level is going to be erroneous until the reference legs are force fed) 0419 The containment vessel pressure drops to 113 psia (this would indicate the containment began to leak at this point as pressure was being relieved and is probably contributed to the read levels later in the torus and in general to the workers. This established the path for hydrogen to possibly enter the reactor building later.) 0514 onsite dose rates are noticed (this is when the operators think the containment failed) 0900 order given to vent unit 1 1430 Unit 1 effectively vented (page 11and 20) due to rupture disc failure. Not due to operator action 1536 explosionI am at a loss to explain how without power and more specifically control air how the operators would be able to protect the plant and prevent containment failure. As Kit will be sure to point out I never operated a BWR (I'm SMR PWR all the way) so I may have missed something in my analysis. I also couldn't find the containment design pressure through this reading. I imagine that design pressure is around 60 psia. It also looks like the rupture discs are more of a hinderance than help Reply

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